The Chinese Organizations Involved in Transnational Repression
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is conducting two parallel campaigns of Transnational Repression (TNR) against distinct victim sets. The first is aimed at minorities and critics of the regime and its policies. It is conducted mainly by State security and public security organizations with the objective to track and silence them. The second is directed at “economic fugitives” - former insiders who fled abroad with money and knowledge of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s inner working. Public security bodies, procuratorates and discipline authorities for the CCP are working together to repatriate them. In both cases, structures and networks affiliated with United Front work are being leveraged.
A note on the data: This assessment is based on the analysis of over 30 cases of TNR for which the Chinese organizations involved have been identified. It was complemented by academic writings, reports by non-governmental organizations and intelligence released by Western governments. The PRC political-legal system includes many other organizations that have a role in combatting dissent, “problematic” cults, and corruption. However, cases compiled do not indicate these bodies play a role overseas. Therefore, they are not included in this piece. Likewise, national and regional coordinating bodies are not being covered here.
The most important goal of the CCP is to remain in power. It uses its state and political apparatuses to target threats to its regime and advance its political and economic interests abroad. Thus, the PRC is running the most sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of TNR in the world.
Two distinct groups of individuals are being targeted. The first comprises minorities and critics of the regime. The second includes former insiders that are accused of crimes of political or economic corruption. This distinction is particularly important in understanding the actors involved in the PRC’s overseas repression.
Minorities and Critics of the Regime
The CCP often refers to the “Five Poisons” as the groups threatening the stability and legitimacy and its regime. While these categories generally remain accurate, the PRC’s recent actions shed light on the groups that are its most important targets. Today, the CCP considers the following groups as threats to its power and policies:
· Pro-democracy activists in the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong.
· Members of the Uyghur and Mongolian minorities.
· Tibetan autonomy activists, and
· Falun Gong followers.
The main Chinese organization involved in targeting these groups is the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the principal civilian intelligence agency of the PRC. The vast majority of its work is indeed dedicated towards domestic security and dissident suppression. The 10th Bureau - Foreign Security and Reconnaissance is probably responsible for such work at the central level of the agency.
Abroad, the MSS uses diplomatic and journalistic covers to conduct these operations. The 2nd Bureau – “Open line” Operations at the MSS’s headquarters manages the officers posted under covers overtly affiliated with the state, in diplomatic missions and offices of State media. As an example, an MSS officer working under the cover of a People’s Daily correspondent in Sweden was involved in handling two separate sources reporting on Tibetan and Uyghur activists. These agents also met with other MSS officers from Chinese diplomatic missions in Europe, including one serving as a press officer at the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm.
While the MSS plays an important role in targeting critics of the CCP, most of its intelligence collection is actually being conducted by provincial State Security Departments (SSDs) and municipal State Security Bureaus (SSBs), some focused on specific geographical areas based on the international connections of their region. Indeed, they most likely have intelligence requirements related to dissidents with a nexus to their area of responsibility. For instance, the Shanghai SSB trains officers to be fluent in Uyghur and Tibetan in order to work against these targets. The recruitment and the handling of a source from the pro-democracy movement in New York, United States, was likewise executed collaboratively by the SSBs from the Guangdong and Shandong provinces.
Cyber operations against minorities and critics appear to be conducted mostly by SSDs and their front companies. For instance, hackers working for the benefits of the Guangdong State Security Department managed a campaign of computer network operations targeting political dissidents, religious minorities, and human rights activists in the PRC and in many Western countries.
Another organization, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), also plays an important role in going after minorities and critics of the regime. The MPS is the principal domestic security and policing agency of the PRC, responsible for law enforcement and for maintaining social and political stability. The main body within the MPS with such responsibility is the 1st Bureau - Political Security Protection. Within its mandate, it is tasked with public security investigations overseas.
For 20 years, the Anti-Falun Gong activities were overlapping between the 1st Bureau and the network of 610 Offices, before the latter was incorporated into the MPS in 2018. Created in 1999 as extra-legal entities, the 610 offices had the mission to suppress Falun Gong and other “problematic” cults. According to a Chinese diplomat in 2005, each PRC diplomatic mission had at least one official responsible for the Falun Gong file. A case in Germany from around this time involved such officers. In 2019, this task was finally placed under the MPS’s 4th Bureau - Work on Preventing and Dealing with Evil Cult Crimes.
Much like the MSS, most of the public security operations are conducted by provincial Public Security Departments (PSDs) and municipal and county Public Security Bureaus (PSBs). The 1st Bureau is represented in these subnational units. Chinese local PSBs are reportedly used to meet dissidents travelling to the PRC, or their family members if they live abroad, in order to pressure them into silence or to collaborate and report on fellow activists. For instance, MPS officers visited the brother of a Canadian Uyghur that requested to get a visa in 2013 to return to the PRC. They told him he would be granted a visa if he agreed to cooperate. Upon his arrival, he was interrogated for 10 hours in an MPS office.
PSDs and PSBs have an operational presence online, especially through the 912 Special Project Working Group. According to charges filed in the U.S., this organization uses fake accounts online to threaten, intimidate, and harass dissidents around the world. The group is based at the Beijing PSB and its members come from the 1st Bureau, the 5th Bureau - Criminal Investigation, and the 11th Bureau – Cyber Security of the MPS and different PSDs and PSBs. To censor critics online, the 11th Bureau also works with the Cyberspace Administration of China and what appears to be multiple Network Propaganda Guidance Centers.
While the MSS and the MPS are involved in operations targeting minorities and critics of the regime, there are distinctions between state security and public security functions as part of these political security missions, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. The state security apparatus relies more on clandestine work and has a stronger emphasis on intelligence gathering, whereas the public security bodies are often involved in threatening families in the PRC. Nevertheless, their common objectives are to track and silence their targets.
The MPS reportedly coordinates part of its work with the MSS, and they may also work on some of the same targets. Such was the case during the 2008 Olympic Torch Run. Chinese MSS and MPS officers flew in to San Francisco, U.S. for the event. Together, they surveilled and disrupted Falun Gong, Tibetan, Uyghur and pro-democracy protesters.
Finally, both state security and public security organizations resort to cyber contractors in the PRC. They appear to follow the provincial/local structures of the MSS and MPS and offer their services to clients from these operational levels. For instance, the contracts to monitor dissidents for the firm Sichuan i-SOON were attributed by state security and public security clients interested in targets with a nexus to their area of responsibility.
Cyber contractors also work closely with the cyber front companies set up by State security bodies. With the support of contractors, the Hubei State Security Department executed computer network exploitation and computer intrusion activities through a front company, targeting thousands of entities all over the world, including pro-democracy activists. This joint effort is known externally as APT31.
“Economic Fugitives”
In 2014, the PRC launched the Fox Hunt campaign, officially geared towards fighting corruption and convincing fugitives, mostly CCP members and former officials, to return to the country. In 2015, Operation Sky Net was initiated by the PRC's Supreme People's Procuratorate, the Chinese public prosecutor, to combat several issues such as money laundering, fake passports, and illegal income. Operation Fox Hunt became one of the branches of this operation. It includes elements of the public security apparatus and judicial agencies.
These anti-corruption efforts aim at securing political loyalty within the CCP, avoiding splits in its ranks, and more broadly, strengthening the Party’s discipline. At the national level, they play an important role in the PRC’s efforts to maintain stability and legitimacy for the regime, as per a Canadian intelligence assessment.
The targeting of former CCP insiders under the guise of anti-corruption also serves to push aside political opponents of the current Chinese leadership. Indeed, British authorities assess that “economic fugitives” are most likely to be in fact high-profile opposition figures.
The MPS is the leading agency in the Fox Hunt/Sky Net campaign. Many of its subunits are mobilized to bring back wanted “economic fugitives”. In 2021, a film called “The Hunting” based on operation Fox Hunt was produced with the support of the 2nd Bureau - Economic Crime Investigations. The 5th Bureau - Criminal Investigations is also reportedly involved in tracking these targets.
MPS officers generally travel from the PRC on specific Fox Hunt missions. In 2015, the U.S. government warned Chinese authorities to stop sending such officers to the U.S. to pursue Fox Hunt targets under touristic or trade visas.
These delegations are supported abroad by declared MPS liaison officers posted in Chinese diplomatic missions. Their official role includes safeguarding the PRC’s national security and tracking down fugitives as part of operation Fox Hunt. Overseas liaison officers possibly report to the MPS External Liaison Office, which is likely a 1st Bureau nameplate, according to scholars.
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the CCP’s internal policing agency, works closely with the MPS on these operations. The CCDI and its provincial level Discipline Inspection bodies are responsible for enforcing CCP rules and regulations, including the anti-corruption efforts. When operation Fox Hunt was announced, the CCDI merged its Foreign Affairs Bureau and Corruption Prevention Office into the International Cooperation Bureau to make it the main CCDI organization involved in tracking “economic fugitives”.
In 2018, the PRC established the National Supervisory Commission (NSC), a larger version of the CCDI. Unlike the latter, it is a government agency and not a party body. Consequently, it has authority over all government officials. However, according to Safeguard Defenders, the NSC is merely an extension of the CCDI, and it is used to justify investigating non-Party members.
Alongside the MPS and the CCDI, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate represents the government in the prosecution of individuals brought back to the PRC as part of the Fox Hunt/Sky Net campaign. It appears that it could be specifically the Anti-Corruption Bureaus that are involved in Fox Hunt operations abroad.
Most of these operational trips are being accomplished by provincial and local level PSDs and PSBs, Procuratorates and Discipline inspection bodies. For example, employees of the Shandong Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, a prosecutor with the Hanyang People’s Procuratorate, and police officers with the Wuhan PSB went after a Fox Hunt target in the U.S. in order to repatriate him. They travelled with a family member forced into the operation to convince the target to surrender.
As for the MSS, while it sits on the main national anti-corruption coordination body, the agency appears to play no role in the Fox Hunt/Sky Net campaign abroad. Only one instance of MSS involvement in the case of a Fox Hunt target was found. However, the man, a wealthy Chinese businessman living in the U.S., had been using social media to make allegations of corruption against senior Chinese officials, thus making him a critic of the regime. The MSS visited him in order to convince him to “stop inciting anti-Communist Party sentiment”. The MSS has also tried to recruit a source to report on the man’s activities and his associates, wanting to know how many people are involved in pro-democracy groups in the U.S.
Support from United Front Work Entities
The targeting of minorities, critics of the regime and “economic fugitives” is being supported by the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a CCP entity, and a large network of united front work organizations.
The UFWD targets diaspora communities with the goal of shaping, controlling, and homogenizing them. Regarding the dissidents specifically, its objectives are to pressure individuals to self-censor and to harass groups that are critical of the Chinese rulers. The 9th Bureau - Overseas Chinese Affairs General Office has regional responsibilities within the UFWD, including Americas and Pacific Divisions, therefore making it the likely responsible unit of most of these efforts.
In 2018, the UFWD incorporated the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), a separate entity of the PRC government reportedly involved in infiltrating overseas Chinese communities and targeting Chinese dissidents through intelligence gathering and surveillance. The absorption of the OCAO brought many officials with overseas experience into the UFWD and increased the support for its activities inside diplomatic missions.
This reform was meant to strengthen the UFWD. Consequently, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is now its relative subordinate on united front issues, giving more control to the UFWD on diplomats responsible for overseas Chinese work. Indeed, most of the united front work aimed at the diaspora comes from diplomats affiliated with the UFWD, rather than the MFA. In 2020, a Tibetan-born New York Police Department (NYPD) community affairs officer was accused of working on behalf of the Chinese Consulate to collect information on Chinese citizens in New York, U.S., and assess potential sources in the Tibetan community. One of the consular officials he was in contact with worked for the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture, a UFWD-led organization. A man from this same entity was barred from attending a Human Rights Council session in Geneva, Switzerland, after he photographed at close range a woman who gave testimony about her father, who is serving a life sentence in the PRC for his political activities.
The UFWD works closely with Chinese intelligence organizations. According to PRC expert Alex Jokse, the MSS’s symbiosis with united front networks today is as strong as ever. The Chinese diplomatic missions, aside from MPS liaison officers, have been used regularly to support visiting MPS personnel working to locate and repatriate Fox Hunt targets. Intelligence officers from the State security apparatus have also been known to use the covers of UFWD and the OCAO. For example, the diplomat in 2018 responsible for Overseas Chinese Affairs at the San Francisco Consulate in the U.S. was a suspected MSS officer.
The collaboration between the MPS and the UFWD is evident in the creation of Police Overseas Service Stations abroad. Chinese PSBs established these representations in multiple countries, most often with the help of Chinese nationals with local businesses who are double hatted with leadership functions within UFWD-linked organizations. The main role of these stations is to offer administrative services to Chinese citizens abroad.
While these offices are not actual police stations, they are closely linked to the UFWD and for some, they have been involved in operations to convince fugitives to return to the PRC, including as part of operation Fox Hunt. In fact, the Special Committee on Canada-China Relations of the House of Commons assessed that their role is to monitor the diaspora, collect intelligence, harass and intimidate people who criticize PRC policies and assist PRC public security authorities in obtaining their forced return. A Chinese leader of a nonprofit organization in Manhattan, U.S., helped the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau establish a service station there. He supported the MPS in organizing counter-protests in Washington against Falun Gong activists and received requests for information on dissidents and fugitives.
Lastly, for its TNR, the UFWD relies on a united front system, that is, a grouping of agencies, social organizations, businesses, universities and individuals. Just like with Police Overseas Service Stations, community organizations are supporting Fox Hunt operations in providing information on targets.
The Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSA) are key entities in these efforts. According to Western intelligence, the CSSAs are part of the UFWD and seek to influence and monitor Chinese students overseas. As per a former Chinese diplomat who defected to Australia, PRC diplomats appoint the leaders at each CSSA and fund them. A former U.S. official alleges that Chinese intelligence officers in diplomatic missions are their primary point of contact. They are being used to collect information and block protest groups when Chinese leaders travel abroad. For instance, a Chinese Consul General in Canada has reportedly tasked Chinese students to collect information on the family of an alleged “economic fugitive”.